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Abstract
There is by now a large consensus in modern monetary policy.
This consensus has been built upon a dynamic general equilibrium
model of optimal monetary policy with sticky prices al aCalvo and
forward looking behavior.
In this paper we extend this standard model by introducing non-
linearity into the Phillips curve. As the linear Phillips curve may
be questioned on theoretical grounds and seems not to be favoured
by empirical evidence, a similar procedure has already been un-
dertaken in a series papers over the last few years, e.g., Schaling
(1999), Semmler and Zhang (2004), Nobay and Peel (2000), Tam-
bakis (1999), and Dolado et al. (2004). However, these papers were
mainly concerned with the analysis of the problem of inﬂation bias,
by deriving an interest rate rule which is nonlinear, leaving the is-
sues of stability and the possible existence of endogenous cycles in
such a framework mostly overlooked.
Under the speciﬁc form of nonlinearity proposed in our pa-
per (which allows for both convexity and concavity and secures
closed form solutions), we show that the introduction of a non-
linear Phillips curve into a fully deterministic structure of the stan-
dard model produces signiﬁcant changes to the major conclusions
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1regarding stability and the eﬃciency of monetary policy in the stan-
dard model. We should emphasize the following main results: (i)
instead of a unique ﬁx e dp o i n tw ee n du pw i t hm u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a ;
(ii) instead of saddle—path stability, for diﬀerent sets of parameter
values we may have saddle stability, totally unstable and chaotic
ﬁxed points (endogenous cycles); (iii) for certain degrees of con-
vexity and/or concavity of the Phillips curve, where endogenous
ﬂuctuations arise, one is able to encounter various results that seem
interesting. Firstly, when the Central Bank pays attention essen-
tially to inﬂation targeting, the inﬂation rate may have a lower mean
and is certainly less volatile; secondly, for changes in the degree of
price stickiness the results are not are clear cut as in the previous
case, however, we can also observe that when such stickiness is high
the inﬂation rate tends to display a somewhat larger mean and also
higher volatility; and thirdly, it shows that the target values for
inﬂation and the output gap (π∗
t,x ∗), both crucially aﬀect the dy-
namics of the economy in terms of average values and volatility of
the endogenous variables – e.g., the higher the target value of the
output gap chosen by the Central Bank, the higher is the inﬂation
rate and its volatility – while in the linear case only the π∗
t does
so (obviously, only aﬀecting in this case the level of the endoge-
nous variables). Moreover, the existence of endogenous cycles due
to chaotic motion may raise serious questions about whether the old
dictum of monetary policy (that the Central Bank should conduct
policy with discretion instead of commitment) is not still very much
in the business of monetary policy.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy, Interest Rate Rules, Non-
linear Phillips Curve, Endogenous Fluctuations and Stabilization
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s we have witnessed an increasing consensus in the
conduct of modern monetary policy. Goodfriend and King (1997) have
labelled this new consensus as ”The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the
Role of Monetary Policy”, while Clarida et al. (1999) called it the ”The
Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective”. This new
framework is a natural extension of the seminal idea developed by Taylor
(1993), in which the central bank should conduct monetary policy through
an aggressive and publicly known rule with commitment. In fact, this
emerging consensus besides turning upside down the basic prescriptions
of monetary and ﬁscal policies of the old Neoclassical Synthesis of the
60’s and 70’s, has also led to a standard DGEM so successful that, as
Laurence Ball has recently put it ”the model is so hot that the Keynesians
and Classicals ﬁght over who gets credit for it” (2005, 265).
The standard model in this new strand of literature is the old IS/LM
model extended with micro foundations, forward looking expectations and
price rigidity following the seminal work of Calvo (1983). It has a conven-
tional IS curve, derived from an optimal control problem in which families
evaluate the trade-oﬀ between consumption vs saving and between leisure
vs labour, in which present output is a function of real expected inter-
est rates (negatively), and positively of future expected output and of
aggregate demand shocks, these taken as e.g. government expenditures.
The second major element of this new synthesis is an aggregate supply
function expressed in terms of a traditional Phillips Curve, but now also
derived from microeconomic principles, in which in any period of time a
signiﬁcant proportion of ﬁrms cannot adjust prices instantaneously due
to market imperfections. In this new Phillips curve, it has been largely
assumed that the rate of inﬂation is a linear positive function of the
output gap, for a given level of expected inﬂation, with an added supply
shock.
Finally, the model is closed by stipulating the behavior of the central
bank. If this bank controls the short term interest rate, then it has to
somehow present a rule such that inﬂation and output (or output gap)
are ingredients to be taken into account in the maximization of social
welfare. For practical reasons, it has been assumed that the central bank
has quadratic loss preferences over inﬂation and the output gap, such
that its objective is to minimize the squared errors of these two variables
with respect to their target values.
This standard model has been extended or reﬁned in several ways over
the last few years. The list would be so extensive that we mention here
only what we consider to be more relevant as far as the basic structureEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 4
of the model is concerned. Albanesi (2000, 2005) has introduced hetero-
geneous agents into the IS function. Endogenous price rigidity has been
studied by Carboni and Ellison (2003) and Siu (2005), and an asymmet-
ric loss function by the central bank has been considered, e.g., by Surico
(2004). Diﬀerent forms of learning have also been taken into account by
Svensson (1999a), Semmler, Greiner and Zhang (2002), and Orphanides
and Williams (2002), while adding investment to the model has been re-
cently analyzed by Sveen and Weinke (2005). The model with an open
economy framework can be found in Razen and Yuen (2001) or in Mc-
Callum and Nelson (2001).
In this paper we extend this standard model by introducing non-
linearity into the Phillips curve. As the linear Phillips curve may be
questioned on theoretical grounds and seems not to be favoured by em-
pirical evidence, a similar procedure has already been undertaken in a
series papers over the last few years, e.g., Schaling (1999), Semmler and
Zhang (2004), Nobay and Peel (2000), Tambakis (1999), and Dolado et
al. (2004). However, these papers were mainly concerned with the analy-
sis of the problem of inﬂation bias, by deriving an interest rate rule which
is nonlinear, leaving the issues of stability and the possible existence of
endogenous cycles in such a framework mostly overlooked. One possible
justiﬁcation for this fact is the type of nonlinearity that is introduced
into the standard model, because, as it is well known in the literature,
quadratic preferences by the central bank with a convex Phillips Curve
as the one used by most of those papers does not secure closed form
solutions.
In contrast, under the speciﬁc form of nonlinearity proposed in our
paper (which allows for both convexity and concavity and secures closed
form solutions), we show that the introduction of a nonlinear Phillips
curve into a fully deterministic structure of the standard model produces
signiﬁcant changes to the major conclusions regarding stability and the
eﬃciency of monetary policy in the standard model. We should empha-
size the following main results: (i) instead of a unique ﬁxed point we
end up with multiple equilibria; (ii) instead of saddle—path stability, for
diﬀerent sets of parameter values we may have saddle stability, totally
unstable and chaotic ﬁxed points (endogenous cycles); (iii) for certain
degrees of convexity and/or concavity of the Phillips curve, where en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations arise, one is able to encounter various results that
seem interesting. Firstly, when the Central Bank pays attention essen-
tially to inﬂation targeting, the inﬂation rate may have a lower mean and
is certainly less volatile; secondly, for changes in the degree of price stick-
iness the results are not are clear cut as in the previous case, however, we
can also observe that when such stickiness is high the inﬂation rate tendsEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 5
to display a somewhat larger mean and also higher volatility; and thirdly,
it shows that the target values for inﬂation and the output gap (π∗
t,x ∗),
both crucially aﬀect the dynamics of the economy in terms of average
values and volatility of the endogenous variables – e.g., the higher the
target value of the output gap chosen by the Central Bank, the higher is
the inﬂation rate and its volatility – while in the linear case only the π∗
t
does so (obviously, only aﬀecting in this case the level of the endogenous
variables).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the nonlinear Phillips
curve is discussed in some detail. Section 3 deals with the dynamic op-
timization analysis of the monetary policy model, while in section 4 is
concerned with the study of the local and global properties of the dy-
namics. In section 5 we discuss some possible implications for monetary
policy from the main results of the nonlinear model and section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The Nonlinear Phillips Curve
”Though analytically convenient, the linear model ignores
much of the historical context underlying the original split
between classical and Keynesian economics: under conditions
of full employment, inﬂation appeared to respond strongly to
demand conditions, while in deep recessions, it was relatively
insensitive to changes in activity” Eric Schaling, 1998, p.3.
The Phillips curve can be presented in a general form as
πt = F(xt)+βEtπt+1 + ut (1)
where F(xt) can be either a linear or a nonlinear function and the sym-
bols stand for: πt is the inﬂation rate; xt is the output gap, Et is an
expectations operator, ut is an autoregressive process of order lower than
one and deﬁned as ut = ρut−1 + b ut, with 0 <ρ<1 and b u˜iid(0,σ2
u).
The new consensus takes this curve as a linear function, but some other
shapes have also been proposed over the last decade. The basic rationale
behind a linear Phillips curve consists of assuming that changes in the
inﬂation rate, caused by a certain change in the output gap, are always of
the same magnitude independently of the level of the output gap, that is,
independently whether the economy is in a boom or in a deep recession.
Nevertheless, despite its extensive use in the recent surge of optimal
IS/LM models, the linear version of the Phillips curve shows three ma-
jor shortcomings, at least as the standard model of the new synthesis isEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 6
concerned. Firstly, it is apparently mainly a result of analytical conve-
nience as the consideration of some form of nonlinearity introduces large
analytical complications to the basic structure of the model. Secondly,
t h e r ei sl i t t l ee v i d e n c eo fl i n e a r i t yi nthe Phillips curve, and thirdly, the
linear version seems to be extremely unrobust. The model’s results are
dramatically altered once one introduces no more than mild convexity or
mild concavity into the Phillips curve. Therefore, apparently the basic
results of the model behind the emerging new consensus remain valid as
long as one is ready to accept an elasticity in the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ
exactly equal to one.
Given this result, it looks somewhat surprising that the nonlinear
version of the Phillips curve has apparently been relegated to a secondary
role in the recent surge of New Keynesian models based on forward looking
expectations and microeconomic principles. And this seems surprising
mainly for four basic reasons.
Firstly, the nonlinear version has a large theoretical appeal, as almost
all original Keynesian models have arrived at shapes which are intrin-
sically nonlinear in both types of models, either those built upon mi-
croeonomic principles in the 80’s and 90’s or those following the old style
developed upon ad hoc assumptions. That was in fact the original result
of Phillips (1958) that has become a traditional presence in almost all
macroeconomic textbooks, as well as the new Keynesian models devel-
oped more recently such as in Ball et al. (1988), Ball and Mankiw (1994),
Stiglitz (1997), Eisner (1997), Sargent (1999), and Akerlof et al. (1996,
2001), to name just a few.
Secondly, the nonlinear Phillips curve may have large empirical rel-
evance. For example, it may explain the inﬂationary bias of monetary
policy as showed by Macklem (1995), and may also explain the asym-
metric eﬀects of monetary policy in several countries, as documented,
e.g., by Cover (1992), Karras (1996), Karras and Stokes (1999), Kauf-
man (2001), Weise (1999) and Peersman and Smets (2001). Moreover, a
nonlinear shape can also explain another crucial fact of modern business
cycles: beneﬁce ratios of inﬂation are smaller than the sacriﬁce ratios of
deﬂation (see Filardo, 1998).
Thirdly, empirical evidence based upon econometric tests somewhat
favours the nonlinear shape in detriment of the linear version. In fact,
tests have encountered evidence of a slightly convex function in vari-
ous studies. This is the case of Clark et al. (1996) who found signiﬁ-
cant nonlinearity for the US, Debelle and Laxton (1997) arrive at similar
conclusions for Canada and the United Kingdom, while Dupasquier and
Ricketts (1998) analyzed the data for Canada and US and concluded that
there is stronger evidence of nonlinearity for the US Phillips curve. OtherEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 7
studies on the shape of the Phillips curve include Eliasson (2001), who
estimates the relation between inﬂation and unemployment for Australia,
Sweden and the United States, and ﬁnds evidence of nonlinearity (never-
theless, without making any strong statement about a convex or concave
shape) which seems stronger for Australia and Sweden than for the US.
In contrast, Eisner (1997) and Stiglitz (1997) found evidence pointing to
a concave Phillips curve for the US data.
Despite the fact that the evidence apparently favours the nonlinear
shape, there are voices in the opposition. For instance, Gordon (1997)
and Blinder (1998) emphasize that the Phillips curve is linear for the US
macroeconomic data, while Aguiar and Martins (2002) ﬁnd evidence of a
linear Phillips curve for the euro zone. Finally, Yates (1998b) found no
signiﬁcant non-linearity for the UK for the period between 1966 and 1994
(quarterly) and for various G7 countries for the period 1800-1938.
Finally, the policy implications of the nonlinear shape seem to be
of signiﬁcant importance and it is worthwhile to mention some of them
here. For example, take the case of a convex Phillips curve. In order
to have an eﬀective control inﬂation (low and stable), the Central Bank
has to prevent inﬂation from leaving the part of the curve in which the
nonlinearity is relatively mild. Secondly, in order to maximize social
welfare, inﬂation should be prevented from taking oﬀ,a st h ec o s t so f
deﬂation are larger than the beneﬁts of inﬂation. Thirdly, the eﬃcacy of
monetary policy is largely asymmetrical: excess supply (negative output
gap) has a much lower impact on inﬂation than excess demand (positive
output gap). On the other hand, if the curve is concave, then the risks of
taking more aggressive policy measures in order to reduce unemployment
might be lower than if the curve were both convex or linear.
2.1 Nonlinear functions
In the literature there are various versions of a nonlinear shape of the
Phillips curve (for a survey see Dupasquier and Ricketts, 1998). One
framework that leads to a convex shape is price setting with capacity
constraints. As Filardo (1998) and Semmler and Zhang (2004) explain,
these constraints mean that the ability of ﬁrms to expand output tends
to decline with accumulated capacity, and thus, increased demand tends
progressively to be translated into higher inﬂation rather than higher out-
put. Moreover, when demand declines ﬁrms prefer to accumulate stocks
instead of large reductions in prices. This reasoning has also been shared
by Clark et al. (1996), Schalling (1999), Laxton et al. (1999), Zhang and
Semmler (2003), Dolado et al. (2004) and Tambakis (2004), among oth-
ers, who explore the economic consequences of a convex aggregate supply
function.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 8













Figure 1: A convex Phillips curve, for λ =0 .5 and θ =1 0 .
As far as the convex version of the Phillips curve is concerned, almost






where 0 <λ<1 is the degree of price ﬂexibility (the level of the inﬂa-
tion/output elasticity, a low value for this parameter represents a high
level of price rigidity) and θ is a convexity parameter. The larger the
value of the latter parameter, the larger is the degree of convexity of the
function; for θ =0we return to the linear new Keynesian Phillips curve.1
For instance, assuming λ =0 .5 and θ =1 0 , the function displays as in
ﬁgure 1.
The capacity constraints argument has been challenged by Eisner
(1997) and Stiglitz (1997), who put forward arguments in favor of a con-
cave Phillips curve. Their explanations are also based upon microeco-
nomic foundations, in particular, their results arise due to monopolistic
competition. Firms act as monopolistic entities and thus they tend to
1Note that function (2) has economic meaning only for xt < 1/(λθ). Zhang and
Semmler (2003) address this issue. They only consider the segment of the curve for
which F






Figure 2: The nonlinear Phillips Curve following Akerlof et al. (2001)
react to increased demand with progressively higher increases on output
rather than by causing inﬂationary pressures. In other words, monopo-
listic ﬁrms do not have to respond necessarily with an increase in prices
when demand rises; if they want to expand their market share, rising
prices is not the best response, if other options are available. Equation
(2) continues to be a possible representation of the Phillips curve when
its shape is concave, all that is needed is to impose θ<0.
The convex vs concave controversy has been signiﬁcantly reconsidered
by Akerlof et al. (1996, 2001). They present a thorough exposition of
arguments that justify a peculiar shape of the Phillips curve (see Figure
2). In panel A, this curve shows a trade-oﬀ between unemployment and
inﬂation which is negative for very low levels of inﬂation, becomes posi-
tive for moderate levels, ending up with the traditional vertical line for
high levels of inﬂation. Translating this reasoning to the output gap vs
inﬂation locus (see panel B), the curve has three branches.
The ﬁrst one is convex which implies a positively sloped Phillips curve,
followed by a second phase in which the curve becomes concave for higher
values of inﬂation. Finally, for very high levels of inﬂation the curve turns
into a vertical straight line (demand shocks are reﬂected only on the in-
ﬂation axes). The economic intuition for this awkward shape can go as
follows. When inﬂa t i o ni sv e r yl o w ,i n ﬂation becomes relatively unim-
portant for individual actions. This occurs as the result of a negative
trade-oﬀ of balancing the costs of obtaining and processing information
( w h i c ha r er e l e v a n ti nm o s tc i r c u m s t a n c e s )a n dt h eb e n e ﬁts from pre-
venting against inﬂa t i o n( w h i c ha r ev e r yl o wi nt h i sc a s ed u et ov e r yl o wEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 10
inﬂation). That is, for low inﬂation, the private agents will just expect
very small changes in inﬂation, even if there are economic signs pointing
at another direction. If individuals expect low inﬂa t i o nw h e ni n ﬂation is
low, monetary authorities can make use of the convex part of the Phillips
curve to increase the output gap and reduce unemployment.
Beyond a certain level of the inﬂation rate, the beneﬁts from pre-
venting against inﬂation overcome the costs of collecting and processing
information, and in this case inﬂation becomes an important problem for
private economic agents. These will take into consideration the available
information to form expectations about future inﬂation, and attempts by
the public authorities to reduce unemployment will in fact be counter-
productive, leading to higher inﬂation and to higher unemployment.
Finally, for very high levels of inﬂation, the costs of collecting infor-
mation are much lower than the beneﬁts from preventing against higher
inﬂation, inﬂation becomes the centre of attention of the whole economic
process and any attempt from the authorities to reduce unemployment
will not be successful, leading only to further inﬂation. In this case the
curve becomes vertical.
2.2 A new nonlinear function
The functions presented above have some particular properties that turn
them of little help for the purpose of this paper. Firstly, the nonlinear
function that has been widely used in the literature (the one put for-
ward by Schalling (1998)), does not allow for closed form solutions of the
standard new Keynesian model, and therefore no signiﬁcant conclusions
could be reached under this scenario. Secondly, the view presented by
Akerlof and associates seems very interesting but raises very complicated
analytical problems that seem worthwhile to avoid for the moment.
Therefore, in this paper we have to revert to a somewhat diﬀerent
version of a nonlinear Phillips curve. The function we propose has two
branches and is deﬁned as
F(xt)=λ[(xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ],x 0 >x ∗
(3)
F(xt)=λ[(x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ],x 0 <x ∗.
Some characteristics of this function are worthwhile to mention. Firstly,
φ is the parameter that leads to convexity, concavity or linearity in both
branches. If φ =1 , the two branches are identical and we are back to
the linear case, where F(xt)=λxt, which is totally similar to the func-
tion proposed by Schalling. Secondly, if we combine the diﬀerent possible
values that φ may assume, with the two diﬀerent domains in which theEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 11
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Figure 3: The nonlinear Phillips curve
branches are deﬁned (x0 >x ∗ and x0 <x ∗), we may have a nonlinear
Phillips curve that is concave for the initial values of the output gap lower
than its target value (x0 <x ∗), and convex for the opposite case (that
is, for x0 >x ∗). In fact, what we do with such a speciﬁcation is to allow
for concavity for low positive and/or for negative values of the output
gap, and to allow for convexity for high values of the output gap. Figure
3s h o w st h ef o u rd i ﬀerent possibilities that may occur with our speciﬁ-
cation of the nonlinear Phillips curve. The scenario that we have just
described above is simply the combination of the two right hand panels,
for a common level of the target value for the output gap (x∗).
The third major characteristic that we would like to mention is the fact
that the function with the two branches allow us to take into considera-
tion the ” historical context underlying the original split between classical
and Keynesian economics”, because under conditions of full employment
(that is, the classical case), inﬂation will strongly respond to excess de-
mand (high values of the output gap), while in deep recessions (extreme
Keynesian cases), inﬂation becomes relatively insensitive to changes in
aggregate demand.
Finally, there is a practical issue which seems of large importance forEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 12
the modelling of Central Bank behavior that can be easily accommodated
by the model. When the Central Bank decides to go for a cut or an
increase in short term interest rates, it does so by assuming that the
present perceived condition of the economy in terms of the output gap
(the initial condition of our model) is below or above its target value.
Therefore, what the model will show us is that it is not irrelevant for the
Central Bank to have x0 >x ∗ or x0 <x ∗ in order to try to achieve its
target value for the output gap. This issue is related to
3T h e M o d e l
Following Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al. (1999), Svensson
(1999b), Woodford (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003), we assume
a standard optimal monetary policy model with sticky prices and forward
looking behavior. This model considers an objective function relating to
Central Bank preferences, which is subject to two constraints that reﬂect
the behavior of the economy’s private sector. The underlying problem
corresponds to an optimal control setup - the monetary authorities make
decisions, in t =0 , regarding future periods. Thus, one may interpret
this setup as a framework with Central Bank commitment over policy
decisions. Given the well understood inﬂationary bias problem, commit-
ment rather than discretion arises as one solution to avoid ineﬃciently
high steady state inﬂation rates.
Consider that at the initial period, t =0 , the Central Bank commits
to a time path for the nominal interest rate, it, that is optimal given its
objective of minimizing through time the diﬀerence between the output
gap (xt) and the corresponding target value (x∗) and between the inﬂation
rate (πt) and its target value chosen by the monetary authority (π∗).









α(xt − x∗)2 +( πt − π∗)2¤¾
(4)
Parameter 1/2 <β<1 is an intertemporal discount factor and 0 ≤ α ≤
1 represents the relative weight given by the Central Bank to the real
stabilization objective in the utility function.
In (4), the inﬂation rate is measured as the percentage change in the
price level between two consecutive periods, while xt corresponds to the
diﬀerence between the eﬀective level of output and its potential level,
both measured in logs, and it should be noticed that potential output is
the level of output correspondent with a situation where wages and prices
are perfectly ﬂexible.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 13
The objective function (4) is subject to two constraints. The ﬁrst is a
forward looking IS equation in which the output gap depends on the real
interest rate and the expected future levels the output gap and takes the
form
xt = −ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+Etxt+1 + gt,x 0 given (5)
parameter ϕ>0 is an interest elasticity, Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 are the
private sector expectations about next period’s levels of the inﬂation rate
and the output gap, and gt translates eventual shocks over government
purchases and/or potential output. This latter variable is deﬁned through
an autoregressive Markov process: gt = µgt−1 + b gt, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, b gt ∼
iid(0,σ2
g).
The second constraint, which characterizes an aggregate supply func-
tion, is a new Keynesian Phillips curve largely discussed in the previous
section. We should recall that in order to avoid analyzing only its linear
standard form, we introduce a function in general form (F(xt))w h i c h
may allow linearity and nonlinearity in the relation between inﬂation and
output.
πt = F(xt)+βEtπt+1 + ut, π0 given (6)
where ut is deﬁned as ut = ρut−1 + b ut, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, b ut ∼ iid(0,σ2
u) and
represents possible cost push shocks.
The intertemporal objective function (4), subject to constraints (5)
and (6), can be solved using the usual tools of dynamic optimization.
I no u rc a s ew ef o l l o wo p t i m a lc o n t r o l . T h ec u r r e n tv a l u eH a m i l t o n i a n



































Variables qt and pt are shadow-prices associated with xt and πt, respec-
tively. The expectations operators for next period inﬂation and output
gap are ignored hereafter, under the hypothesis of a fully deterministic
perfect foresight framework that we adopt from now on.
First order necessary conditions are
ℵi =0= ⇒ qt+1 =0 (8)Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 14
βqt+1 − qt = α(xt − x∗) − ϕqt+1F0(xt)+pt+1F0(xt) (9)
βpt+1 − pt = πt − π∗ + ϕqt+1 − (1 − β)pt+1 (10)
lim
t−→+∞
qtβtxt =l i m
t−→+∞
ptβtπt =0 (11)






pt+1 − pt = πt − π∗ (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we arrive at an equation in which the major









[πt − F(xt) − βπ∗] (14)
The reduced form of our dynamic problem is comprised of a system of
two diﬀerence equations, which are equation (14) and the Phillips curve.
Recall that the solution of this system corresponds to the optimal time
paths of the two endogenous variables, which are obtained when the Cen-
tral Bank chooses the interest rate time trajectory that minimizes the
losses relatively to the target values of inﬂation and the output gap.
The optimal interest rate rule (the interest rate trajectory underly-
ing the solution of the optimal control problem) may produce stable or
unstable paths for the inﬂation rate and the output gap. The stability
concern should be vital for monetary policy evaluation, and therefore
we should concentrate on the perception of the dynamics underlying the
system composed by equations (6) and (14).
3.1 The linear case
As the linear case constitutes the benchmark relatively to which we will
examine the implications of a non linear Phillips curve, let us begin by
reviewing this case. Consider a linear function F(xt)=λxt,w i t h0 <
λ<1 t h ed e g r e eo fp r i c eﬂexibility (inﬂation-output elasticity). A low
value of this parameter means a high lev e lo fp r i c es t i c k i n e s so rr i g i d i t y .
For this F function, equation (6) represents the standard new Keynesian
Phillips curve.



















which is linear and, hence, local and global dynamic results coincide. To


























we assure that one, and only one, of the eigenvalues of J is located in-
side the unit circle and a saddle-path stability arises as the only possible











is reached only if the initial point is
over the saddle-path or stable trajectory, which we can compute as fol-







is a corresponding eigenvector.
Therefore, the stable trajectory is
xt − x∗ =
1 − βε1
λ
(πt − π∗) (17)
Since −1 <ε 1 < 1, the slope of the stable trajectory is positive, indicat-
ing that for a pair (π0,x 0) over the stable arm, the convergence to the
steady state succeeds and the inﬂation rate and the output gap will both
decline/rise towards the ﬁxed point.
The linear case allows for a single possibility regarding the qualitative
behavior of the variables’ evolution over time (saddle-path stability). The
introduction of a non linear Phillips curve will radically change this, even
for mild degrees of convexity or concavity, as we will show in the following
sections.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 16
3.2 The nonlinear case.
We consider two alternative cases for the introduction of nonlinearity into
the Phillips curve, both taking into account that the target value for the
output gap is likely to be a non negative value (x∗ ≥ 0).2 The two cases
can be separately analyzed and they depend essentially on whether the
currently perceived output gap is lower than its target value (x0 >x ∗) or
higher than the perceived value by the Central Bank (x0 <x ∗).D e ﬁning a
positiveparameterφ,t h et w os p e c i ﬁc nonlinear functions are the following
F(xt)=λ[(xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ],x 0 >x ∗
F(xt)=λ[(x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ],x 0 <x ∗
Notice that the two above functions contain the properties required
for our Phillips curve to assume the desired generic form. First, for φ =1 ,
the functions are identical and we are back to the linear case. Second,
the function can be either concave or convex for both cases depending on
the value of φ and on whether the initial condition is to the left/right of
the target value of the output gap.
Under the speciﬁc nonlinear functions chosen for F(xt), the following
two systems should be evaluated in order to derive any kind of results
potentially useful for policy implications:








(xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ
i
(18)
xt+1 = x∗ +
½




πt − λ((xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ) − βπ∗
i¾1/(2−φ)








(x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ
i
(19)
xt+1 = x∗ −
½




πt − λ((x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ) − βπ∗
i¾1/(2−φ)
Systems (18) and (19) change signiﬁcantly the results of the monetary
policy problem. For several sets of parameter values we will regard, along
2It does not seem likely that the Central Bank has a negative value for the target
value of the output gap, for reasons that, we hope, are easily understood.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 17
the following section, that deterministic endogenous cycles are generated.
Chaotic motion will characterize the evolution of the output gap and
of the inﬂation rate over time (there is sensitive dependence on initial
conditions). Note also that the existence of a unique steady state locus
will certainly be replaced by a scenario of multiple equilibria.
4 Local and global dynamics
In this section we present the dynamic behavior of the two models deﬁned
in (18) and (19). There are several equilibrium points real and/or com-
plex conjugate but only one, for each model, is consequent with perfectly
acceptable values for the endogenous variables. This equilibrium point is
analytically determined and discussedi nd e t a i li nw h a tf o l l o w s .S a d d l e -
node bifurcations are possible and a Neimark-Sacker (or torus breakdown)
bifurcation route to chaos is encountered when the parameter β is varied.
S i n c ew eh a v ep o w e rf u n c t i o n sw eh a v et oc o n s i d e rp o s i t i v es q u a r ep o w -
ers in order to ensure the existence of real iterations. This is the reason
why in the numerical examples presented below we almost always assume
φ =1 .5 (which gives 1/(2 − φ)=2 ) .
4.1 The case: x0 >x ∗
Proposition 1 The dynamical system (18) has always an unstable equi-
librium point given by








Proof. In order to compute the equilibrium points we have to solve








(xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ
i
xt = x∗ +
½




πt − λ((xt − x∗)φ +( x∗)φ) − βπ∗
i¾1/(2−φ)









and from the second we can obtain









. (21)Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 18



















For φ =1in (22) we obtain the equilibrium discussed for the linear case.




1+trace(J) + det(J) > 0
1 − trace(J) + det(J) > 0
1 − det(J) > 0
,
where J is the Jacobian matrix computed at the ﬁxed point. We have,
then, ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






αβ (2 − φ)
u2 > 0 iﬀ φ<2
−
λ2φ2
αβ (2 − φ)















This means that there is no φ such that the equilibrium is stable.
The other real ﬁxed point can not be determined analytically, but
numerical calibration for the parameters show that this ﬁxed point cor-
responds to very large values and it is always unstable.
For the admissible values of the parameters the system has an aperi-
odic motion. By solving
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩





αβ (2 − φ)
u2 =0
1 − trace(J)+d e t ( J)=−
λ2φ2






we obtain, if possible, the period-doubling (a single real eigenvalue, µ,
crosses the boundary of stability with µ = −1), the Neimark-Saker (con-
jugated complex pair crosses the boundary of stability) and the Saddle-
Node (a single real eigenvalue crosses the boundary of stability withEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 19
Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram for β














there is a period-doubling bifurcation (however, since we are mainly in-
terested in the case φ<2, that is, not too pronounced nonlinearity, this





we have a saddle-node bifurcation, and for β =1there is a Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation.
The bifurcation diagrams of the πt variable when the parameters β,
α and λ are varied are presented in Figures 4 and 5. In all bifurcation
diagram it is characteristic a pronounced increasing of the variable πt
when the parameter α it is increased and decreasing when the parameters
λ and β are increased. It is also typical a several pieces attractor with
tendency to join in an unique strange attractor when β and λ decrease
and α increase.
A typical strange attractors and the associated time series for the πt
variable are presented in Figure 6. There are two cases, in the ﬁrst one a
several pieces attractor for β =0 .95 and in the second one the asymptotic
behavior of the system is convergent to the one piece strange attractor
for β =0 .88. The other parameters values considered here are: α =0 .5;
π∗ =0 .01; φ =1 .5; λ =0 .8; x∗ =0 .01; x(1) = 0.011; π(1) = 0.02.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 20
Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram for the πt variable when the parameters α
and λ are varied













































beta = 0.95 
beta = 0.88 
Figure 6: Strange attractors for diferent values of the parameter β.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 21
4.2 The case: x0 <x ∗
Proposition 2 The dynamical system (19) has always an unstable equi-
librium given by the following point









Proof. In order to compute the equilibrium points we have to solve








(x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ
i
xt = x∗ −
½




πt − λ((x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ) − βπ∗
i¾1/(2−φ)





(x∗)φ − (x∗ − xt)φ
´
(23)
and from the second we obtain

































1+trace(J) + det(J) > 0
1 − trace(J) + det(J) > 0
1 − det(J) > 0
,
where J is the Jacobian matrix computed at the ﬁxed point. We have
then ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






αβ (2 − φ)
u2 > 0 iﬀ φ<2
−
λ2φ2
αβ (2 − φ)
















This means that there is no stable equilibrium, independently of the value
of φ.
The other real ﬁxed point can not be determined analytically, but
numerical calibration for the parameters shows that this ﬁxed point is
very large, always unstable or explode to inﬁnity.
Analogous to the ﬁrst model if we solve the conditions
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩





αβ (2 − φ)
u2 =0
1 − trace(J)+d e t ( J)=−
λ2φ2






w em a yo b t a i nt h eﬁrst period-doubling bifurcation location, the Neimark-













there is a period-doubling bifurcation (again, the result is not relevant,





we have a saddle-node bifurcation and for β =1there is a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation.
When the parameter β is varied the dynamics is characterized by high
order Neimark-Sacker bifurcations, breakdown of closed invariant curves,
stretching and folding, and all this route leads the system to settle down
in a chaotic dynamics as it is shown in Figure 7.
Moreover, when we vary the parameters α and λ in the interval ]0,1[
the system is always chaotic, with eigenvalues with modulus greater than
1; this means that the ﬁrst bifurcations happen for parameter values
outside the given intervals. Figures 8 and 9 show the complex motion of
the model, where no stability windows can be observed.
If we vary the x∗ parameter, the bifurcation diagram of the variable
πt is more suggestive, illustrating several stability windows, where high
order Neimark-Sacker bifurcations take places. In these windows severalEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 23
Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram for the variable xt when β is varied
Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram when α is variedEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 24
Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram when λ is varied
Figure 10: Stange attractor for the inﬂation rate produced when the
target value for the output gap is changed..Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 25





















Figure 11: Strange attractor and time series of πt variable
closed invariant curves start to stretch and fold, and after all breakdown
and join in a chaotic attractor. We can also observe the increasing of the
variable, when the parameter x∗ it is increased.
For the strange attractor and the associated time series of variable
πt presented in Figure 11 we compute the dominant Lyapunov expo-
nent L (for example Figure 12 shows the average value of the Lyapunov
exponent) for the following parameter calibration: β =0 .99; α =0 .1;
π∗ =0 .015; φ =1 .5; λ =0 .8; x∗ =0 .05.
We obtain that L =5 .7403 and this result conﬁrm the chaotic nature
of the system, because a positive Lyapunov exponent is a necessary con-
dition for chaos. For the estimation of the Lyapunov exponent we used a
version of the Wolf algorithm for 15.000 points.
Parameter calibration: β =0 .99; α =0 .1; π∗ =0 .03; φ =1 .5; λ =0 .8;
x∗ =0 .06; x(1) = 0.01; π(1) = 0.02 with the following strange attractor
and time series of the πt variable (Figure 13).
5 Implications for Monetary Policy
The introduction of a nonlinear Phillips curve into the structure of a
standard optimal monetary model with sticky prices, forward looking
behavior and commitment by the central bank has produced the following
major results:Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 26
Figure 12: Dominant Lyapunov exponent






















Figure 13: Strange attractor and time series of πtEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 27
• it leads to multiple equilibria, instead of a unique ﬁxed point as in
the linear case; although some of these (real) equilibria may raise
questions about their associated values for the endogenous variables;
• it allows for a very sophisticated kind of dynamics, from saddle-
path stability, to total instability and even to chaotic dynamics
(endogenous ﬂuctuations) for a standard set of parameter values,
while in the linear case we end up only with saddle stability;
• it shows that the parameter α (the central bank relative importance
given to output-gap stabilization) is a fundamental factor in the
dynamics of inﬂation and output, while it does not happen in the




• it shows that the target values for inﬂation and the output gap
(π∗
t,x ∗), both crucially aﬀect the dynamics of the economy in terms
of average values and volatility of the endogenous variables, while in
the linear case only the target value for inﬂation does so (obviously,
only aﬀecting in this case the level of the endogenous variables).
Let us produce some short comments on each of these points, skipping
the ﬁrst and the potential importance of sunspots in the presence of
multiple equilibria for the sake of brevity.
Saddle-path stability vs chaotic dynamics
Reconsider the linear case. We have seen, in section 3, that this case
produces saddle-path stability, and in order to guarantee the absence of
an explosive path for inﬂation, the Central Bank would have to choose the
interest rate trajectory that maintains the system always on the stable
trajectory. Hence, monetary policy involves, in the linear Phillips curve
setup, a knife-edge result: if we fall outside the only admissible path,
real and nominal economic aggregates will depart from admissible values
and these cannot be recovered without breaking the commitment with
an initially chosen interest rate time path. However, the story goes that
once the commitment is broken, monetary policy loses credibility, and
the task of maintaining price stability is seriously damaged.
Furthermore, we have encountered a unique steady state point, where
the system rests after the convergence along the stable arm is completed.
If the Central Bank is capable of keeping the interest rate at the level nec-
essary to reach this ﬁxed point, one has found that the long run inﬂation
rate will settle down to the respective target value, that is,
_
π = π∗,a n d





Note that α, that is, the parameter reﬂecting Central Bank preferencesEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 28
over output stabilization, is absent from the long run dynamics of the
economy.
However, if the relation between the output gap and inﬂation is not
linear – that is, if a nonlinear Phillips curve is assumed even with mild
convexity and mild concavity – the role of monetary policy becomes dra-
matically changed. First, the local analysis concerning the search for a
stable or unstable node or a saddle result is no longer helpful, because
a global analysis of the dynamics leads to a much more sophisticated
set of possible outcomes. In particular, we have found that for perfectly
standard parameter values chaotic motion is present in the model. This
implies that once one solves the optimal control problem by choosing the
interest rate path that best serves the goals in the Central Bank objec-
tive function, long term time series regarding the endogenous variables
(inﬂation rate and output gap) will display endogenous ﬂuctuations.
In this case, the inﬂation rate will not converge to, neither diverge
from, the target value, ﬂuctuating around this value over time. This is a
characteristic of most chaotic systems, and obviously the output gap will
also exhibit endogenous cycles, but in this case the particular speciﬁcation
of the model implies that the output gap will never be above target (if
x0 <x ∗) nor below the target (if x0 >x ∗). Consequently, the major result
of the presented speciﬁcation of the model is that the nonlinear Phillips
curve is able to generate endogenous business cycles (the output gap is
not a constant long run value) and endogenous price level ﬂuctuations
relatively similar to the ones that we observe in the real world we live in.
Thus, we understand that if the inﬂation rate shows diﬀerent responses to
changes in the output gap for diﬀerent output gap values (a consequence
of the shape of the Phillips curve) the authorities are no longer able to
use monetary policy in order to remain forever on the inﬂation rate target
value.
This seems closer to what reality shows: despite the eﬀorts of the
monetary authority to keep the inﬂation on the selected target, the best
that most Central Banks have achieved is maintaining the inﬂation rate
ﬂuctuating around such target value. Therefore, we conclude that a non-
linear Phillips curve may be able not only to reproduce results that ﬁt
relatively well with empirical evidence, but that it can also explain why
despite the constant eﬀorts made by monetary authorities, we continue
to see that price evolution and real stabilization are far from producing
fully predictable and smooth long term results.
Changes in parameter values
The four crucial parameters of the model are α,λ,x∗ and π∗.W e
were able to study the impact of changes in parameter values, through
the visualization of bifurcation diagrams. The most important results atEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 29
this level are the one concerning the values of α,λ,x∗. Firstly, recall that
α translates the relative concern of the Central Bank with real stabiliza-
tion; the lower is its value, the more the Central Bank will "pay attention"
only to inﬂation targeting. The result that we obtain, for several para-
meterizations, is admissible from an economic point of view, and it also
supports the current commonly accepted view that the crucial concerns
of central banks should be with the control of inﬂation. The argument
can be easily spotted in the bifurcation diagrams: rising the value of α
does not produce signiﬁcant changes in terms of output gap; nevertheless,
it has a growing negative impact in inﬂation stabilization; the higher is
the value of α, the more volatile is the time series of the inﬂation rate.
This large volatility of price changes introduces high uncertainty into the
economic system, and this can be harmful in terms of potential long run
real growth.
Secondly, another crucial result concerns changes in x∗. The bifurca-
tion diagram in Figure 10 shows that the volatility of inﬂation increases
dramatically when the target value for the output gap is increased from
1t o6 % .T h i sr e s u l ti st o t a l l yd i ﬀerent from the one of the linear case as
changes in the parameter produce no impact at all in both the ﬁxed point
or in the transitional dynamics. In the nonlinear case here, if the Central
Bank accepts a large value for the target output gap, the nonlinearities
in the economy will lead to cycles of a large amplitude, and therefore,
policy advice is maintain target values as close as possible to zero.
Thirdly, changes in the value of λ also produce some results but now
not as relevant as the two previous ones. An increase in λ (that is, lower
levels of price rigidity) may lead to a lower level of inﬂation or to a
no relevant impact at all depending whether the initial condition of the
economy is above or below the target value for the output gap.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We studied a totally standard optimal monetary policy problem, following
the model that has become a major cornerstone in modern monetary
policy, and developed, e.g. by Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al.
(1999), Woodford (2003) and many others. The only new ingredient was
to assume that the Phillips curve should be nonlinear, allowing both for
convexity and concavity, depending whether the economy (or rather, the
initial condition forecasted by the Central bank) is below or above the
target value for the output gap. This nonlinearity shows two advantages
over the linear case. Firstly, there are sound logical reasons to expect that
the Phillips curve should be nonlinear, and secondly, empirical evidenceEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 30
seems to favour the existence of some form of nonlinearity in the Phillips
curve.
As it is well known, the standard model leads to a set of very im-
portant results, from which the most important one may include: (i) the
crucial instrument of monetary policy ought to be the short term interest
rate; (ii) policy should be focused on the control of inﬂation; (iii) inﬂa-
tion can be eﬃciently controlled by an aggressive increasing of short term
interest rates; and (iv) the central bank should conduct monetary pol-
icy adopting a strategy of commitment in a forward-looking environment
(instead of discretion).
The introduction of a nonlinear Phillips curve into the structure of
a standard optimal monetary model with sticky prices, forward looking
behavior and commitment by the central bank has produced the following
major results:
• it leads to multiple equilibria, instead of a unique ﬁxed point as in
the linear case; although some of these (real) equilibria may raise
questions about their associated values for the endogenous variables;
• it allows for a very sophisticated kind of dynamics, from saddle-
path stability, to total instability and even to chaotic dynamics
(endogenous ﬂuctuations) for a standard set of parameter values,
while in the linear case we end up only with saddle stability;
• it shows that the parameter α (the central bank relative importance
given to output-gap stabilization) is a fundamental factor in the
dynamics of inﬂation and output, while it does not happen in the
linear case;
• it shows that the target values for inﬂation and the output gap
(π∗
t,x ∗), both crucially aﬀect the dynamics of the economy in terms
of average values and volatility of the endogenous variables, while in
the linear case only the target value for inﬂation does so (obviously,
only aﬀecting in this case the level of the endogenous variables).
These results seem to conﬁrm the relevance of some of the major
results of the standard model. For example, if the central bank relative
importance given to output-gap stabilization increases, inﬂation will show
a higher mean and higher volatility. Moreover, a similar backing seems
to come out from changes in the parameter of price rigidity. The more
price rigidity we have, the higher the inﬂation rate will be (however, the
model is not as aﬃrmative in this case as in the previous one).
Nevertheless, we believe the nonlinear results above presented could
also very well be used to question the relevance of other major resultsEndogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 31
of the standard model, such as, that discretion leads to an inﬂation bias
problem so clearly understood in the literature. There is some sense
of irrationality in a consistent behavior of no—discretion at all, if the
persistent objective of controlling inﬂation and the output gap leads to
permanent cycles of some magnitude in the endogenous variables. Is
not there some room for discretion (or of optimal discretion) even in
fully deterministic framework? The control of chaos may show that these
cycles could be easily avoided by simple and very small perturbations to
the economy, without changing its ﬁxed point!
Moreover, the nonlinear model seems to be able to give answers to
some questions that the linear version could hardly provide given its
strictly linearity. What happens to the economy if, for example, by some
reason the target values of inﬂation and the output gap change? The
standard model tells us that, as far as the latter one is concerned nothing
happens at all; while in the former, it tells us that the optimal values of
inﬂation and output will increase, nothing really happening to the volatil-
ity in the economy. This is not what one obtains in the case of a nonlinear
Phillips curve in the standard optimal monetary model.Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policy 32
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